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newspapers were distinguished as not a source of litter and the ordinance
sustained in its applicability to other types of distributable material irre-
spective of content. Municipal power to prohibit distribution of other
types, including the smaller-sized pamphlet, solely on the basis of their
tendency to become a source of litter, is doubtful, however, in the light
of the Supreme Court's great emphasis upon the vital necessity of pro-
tecting every sort of publication which affords a vehicle for expression.
If the exercise of municipal power is to be constitutionally successful, it
must at the least be directed to patently undesirable modes of distribution,
to pamphlets or other material of obscene, offensive or dangerous char-
acter, or possibly to both. But the litigation which has so far developed
on this matter of municipal control of distribution does not conclusively
how that a city or state is powerless to subject the distribution of litera-
ture or the exhibition of motion pictures to a control reasonably related
to the promotion of cleanliness in its physical or moral connotations.
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CORPORATIONS
LEGAL ASPECTS OF CO-OPERATIVE MEDICINE
In recent years there has been much interest in co-operative medical
societies. Co-operative medicine is distinguishable from socialized medi-
cine in that it is devoid of any financial aid from the government. It
has been held legal for a nonprofit corporation to furnish members with
medical services rendered by physicians under contracts with the cor-
poration. Group Health Association v. Moor et al., 24 F. Supp. 445
(July 27, 1938) noted, 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 120 (1938). This case
has been publicized as involving a question which has never before been
decided by a court. The formation of such a society in Ohio raises legal
difficulties. Several physicians may organize a partnership through which
they offer their services to the members of a co-operative society. This
would make possible the furnishing of specialized services. However,
under such an organization there is liability on the individual physician
for all acts done by a co-partner which are within the scope of the part-
nership contract. This may serve as a deterrent.
For the co-operative organization to incorporate would facilitate the
administration of such a scheme. However, there are legal obstacles to
such an organization. It is possible that the courts would hold that the
corporation was engaging in the practice of medicine. Ohio G.C.
8623-3, which provides that a corporation for profit may not be organ-
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ized to practice a profession, eliminates the corporation for profit from
engaging in the practice of medicine. Ohio G.C. 8623-97 provides for
the establishment of non profit corporations and states that such corpo-
ration may be formed for any purpose for which natural persons may
lawfully associate themselves. Although natural persons may lawfully
associate themselves for the purpose of practicing a profession, this section
does not authorize a corporation to practice a profession. Dworken v.
1lpt. House Owners Corp., 28 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 115 (930), aft'd,
38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577, 34 Ohio L.R. 234, 9 Ohio L. Abs.
549 (193). It would be impossible for the entity to obtain a certificate
to practice.
The question immediately arises as to what constitutes the practice
of a profession. Does a corporation engage in the practice of medicine
by contracting with a physician to provide services to its stockholders?
There is more case material in Ohio which concerns corporations prac-
ticing law. It has been held that a corporation, not insuring automobile
owners, but agreeing to furnish, free of cost, the services of attorneys in
the prosecution or defenses of claims, etc. rising out of the operation of
automobiles, is engaging in the unlawful practice of law, which will be
enjoined. Goodman v. 1liotorits' Alliance, 29 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 31
(193I). A statement to a title holder that his title is good is the practice
of law by the abstract corporation if such title is not being insured. Land
Title Abstract and Trust Co., et al. v. Dworken, et al., 37 Ohio L.R.
79, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 399 (1932), aff'd, 129 Ohio St. 23, I Ohio Op.
313, 193 N.E. 650 (934). A valid distinction may be made between
cases dealing with attorneys and those dealing with physicians. To
authorize a corporation to practice law is perhaps to authorize the stirring
up of litigation. But for a co-operative corporation to enable and encour-
age its members to obtain the services of a physician is desirable, for both
preventive and corrective medicine are beneficial to the State. The
general rule is that it is the practice of medicine for the corporation to
hire physicians and make contracts with the public to furnish the services
of the physicians. i. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corpo-
rations, sec. 97; 6 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corpora-
tions, sec. 2525; 103 A.L.R. 1240. There are, however, cases which
hold such not to be the practice of medicine by a corporation. State
Electro Medical Inst. v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078, 12 Ann.
Cas. 673 (1905); State Electro Medical Inst. v. Platner, 74 Neb. 73,
103 N.W. 1079, 121 Am. St. Rep. 706 (1905); State ex rel. Sager v.
Lewin, 128 Mo. App. 149, io6 S.W. 581 (1907). State Electro Med-
ical Inst. v. State, supra, has been cited and approved by Golding v.
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Shuback Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 Pac. (2d) 871 (I937) and
People ex rel. State Board of Examiners of Architects v. Rodgers, 277
Il. 151, 115 N.E. 146 (917). See People ex rel. State Board of
Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corporation, Inc., - Cal. -, 82
Pac. (2d) 429 (Sept. 2, 1938). However, a statement in The Youngs-
town Park and Falls Street Railway Co. v. Kessler, 84 Ohio St. 74,
95 N.E. 509, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 5o, Ann. Cas. 19 12B 933 (i91i),
seems to indicate that the Ohio court is in accord with the general rule.
It isn't essential that the corporation hire the physician. The phy-
sician might contract with the members of the corporation individually,
the corporation merely acting as agent in the collection of fees resulting
from the physician-patient contract. Moreover, the corporation could
bargain as the agent of all of its members to obtain a schedule of fees for
services rendered by the physician. It could obtain a building in which
a hospital and clinic would be located. A pharmacy operated by the
corporation could be established in the building. Offices could be rented
to physicians. Expensive X-ray and therapeutic equipment could be
owned by the corporation.
But if the corporation goes too far in what it undertakes to do it
will be found to be engaging in the insurance business. This requires,
in Ohio, the deposit of a bond to the state of at least one hundred thou-
sand dollars (Ohio G.C. 9447) and other restrictions which would not
attach to other methods of accomplishing the result. That the plan of
operation somewhat similar to that described above does not constitute
insurance is held in State v. Universal Service Agency, 87 Wash. 413,
151 Pac. 768, Ann. Cas. I 9 i6C 1017 (915). For the corpora-
tion does not guarantee to the individual that the physician will perform
his contract with the individual. Such a plan as that outlined above could
probably be set up in Ohio and would seem to avoid most of the diffi-
culties described previously. See State v. Laylin, 73 Ohio St. 90, 76
N.E. 567 (905). However, it is always possible to organize a mutual
insurance company the control of which is in the policy holders. Policies
could be issued which cover the expenses incurred in obtaining medical
care. Periodical examinations could be provided for which would enable
the policyholder to obtain many of the advantages which preventive
medicine offers. General Code, section 669 provides that "No law of
this state pertaining to insurance shall be construed to apply to the
establishment and maintenance . . . of . . . hospitals for the reception
and care of patients . . . nor to the furnishing of . . . such services
. . . in connection with any such institution, under or by virtue of any
contract made for such purposes, with residents of the county in which
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such . . . hospital is located." But this statute does not seem to be
broad enough to include the furnishing of medical services except as
merely incidental to the hospitalization.
JEROME H. BROOKS
COUNTIES
LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURIES ARISING OUT OF LABOR
DISPUTES
Plaintiff instituted an action in the Common Pleas Court of Lucas
County against the County Board of Commissioners to recover damages
under sections 6278 and 6281 of the General Code for alleged injuries
sustained at the hands of a mob. The evidence revealed that the plaintiff
answered a knock at the door of his home only to be seized, assaulted,
and seriously injured. A strike was in progress at a nearby plant of the
Electric Auto-Lite Company and the plaintiff had been mistaken for a
strike-breaker by a group of the striking employees. The trial court
ordered a juror withdrawn and dismissed the petition, which action was
reversed by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals and affirmed the trial court. Reynolds v. Lathrop, et al.,
Board of Commissioners of Lucas County, 133 Ohio St. 435, 14 N.E.
(2d) 599, 11 Ohio Op. 103 (1938).
Code section 6278, on which plaintiff relied, reads in part: "A
collection of people assembled for an unlawful purpose and intending to
do damage or injury to anyone, or pretending to exercise correctional
power over other persons by violence and without authority of law, shall
be deemed a 'mob'. . . . An act of violence by a mob upon the body
of any person shall constitute a 'lynching'. . . . " Section 6281 imposes
liability on the county in which a person is assaulted and lynched with
the maximum recovery set at five thousand dollars.
Statutes imposing liability for acts of mob violence on local govern-
mental subdivisions can be traced back to the time of King Canute
(994-1035). Reeves, History of the English Law, p. 30; I Holds-
worth, History of the English Law, p. I I; 22 Halsbury's, Laws of
England, p. 507. At Common Law no liability existed for either injuries
to person or property. Wakely v. Douglas County, io9 Neb. 396, 191
NAV. 337 (1922); Shake v. Board of Comm's of Sullivan County,
210 Ind. 6I, 1 N.E. (2d) 132 (1935); College of Medicine v. Cleve-
land, 12 Ohio St. 375 (186I); Robinson v. Greenville, 42 Ohio St.
625 (1885); Phillips Sheet Tin Plate Go. v. Griffith, Admx., 98 Ohio
